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Abstract
Liquidity, deÞned as the ease with which an asset may be marketed, has a
self-fulÞlling dimension. If investors in the primary market for a new asset
fear an illiquid secondary market, the issuance does not take oﬀ, thereby
vindicating the initial concern about an illiquid secondary market. The fear
of future illiquidity suﬃces to trigger current illiquidity.
The purpose of this paper is to outline a simple model of self-fulÞlling
liquidity.
It develops an issuance model where (i) investors are not Þnancially con-
strained and (ii) have no market power, (iii) there are no transaction costs
and (iv) none withholds private information. Interestingly, assets are illiq-
uid in this frictionless world because of coordination failure among investors.
There is room for coordination failure only because investors fear a future
adverse selection discount if the issuance does not take oﬀ, but there is no in-
formational concern, neither as the issuance takes place, nor in the secondary
market at the equilibria.
Illiquidity as a coordination failure is suﬃcient to predict stylized facts
regarding the design and diﬀusion of Þnancial innovations, without invok-
ing the much stronger informational imperfections required in the existing
literature.
1 Introduction
Broadly speaking, the liquidity of an asset is the ease with which it may be
sold. More precisely, an asset is not perfectly liquid if the expected proceeds
from selling it are strictly less than a fair valuation of the cash ßows it
generates from the sell sides standpoint. This diﬀerence may be termed
"liquidity premium", "bid-ask spread" or "transaction costs" depending upon
the context.
The imperfections identiÞed in the literature as sources of illiquidity are
essentially of four types:
1. The buy side has some market power.
2. There are signiÞcant transaction costs such as matching costs, trans-
portation costs, certiÞcation costs or property rights enforcement costs.
3. The buy side is Þnancially constrained. In this case, she may be unable
to aﬀord the fair price. Financial constraints may stem from a limited
borrowing capacity itself driven by imperfections such as inalienability
of human capital (Hart and Moore 1991, Diamond and Rajan 2000),
incompleteness of contracts (e.g. Aghion and Bolton 1992) or moral
hazard (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole 1997).
4. Some people have private information. The agent endowed with pri-
vate information may be the seller, hence an adverse selection discount
(Akerlof 1970). It may also be the buyers, who then bid strategically
and may derive a nonnegative expected proÞt (e.g. Axelson 2002) if
the issuance mechanism does not allow full signal extraction.
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The purpose of this paper is to show that illiquidity may occur even
absent all these imperfections. The central intuition is that liquidity is self-
fulÞlling, because deals create positive externalities for deals by increasing
the depth of the secondary market, and thus the price of a future resale. The
only primitive invoked to obtain this result is that acquiring an asset today
will provide more information about it tomorrow. As a consequence, todays
potential buyers are concerned to experiencing a lemons problem in case of
future resale if they face only outsiders. Thus, the fear of future adverse
selection suﬃces to trigger coordination failure, although none has private
information, neither in the primary market nor in the secondary market at
the equilibria. The investors current and future reluctances to buy reinforce
each other. In other words, current illiquidity is triggered by the fear of
future illiquidity only.
Overcoming this liquidity externality seems the key to success for Þnancial
innovation. Liquidity externality is indeed a good candidate to explain why
Þnancial innovations such as index based derivatives promoted by large ex-
changes experience diﬃculties to take oﬀ, eventhough their design and insti-
tutional context precisely aims at getting rid of the four sources of illiquidity
mentioned above. Cuny (1993) provides several examples of futures markets
innovations which failed because they were competing with products seeming
intrisically less appealing, but with a better established liquidity. This paper
shows that liquidity as a coordination failure is suﬃcient to explain stylized
facts regarding the design and diﬀusion of Þnancial innovations absent any
other friction.
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1.1 Related Literature
Several contributions have dealt with this broad idea of liquidity external-
ity in capital or credit markets. In Shleifer and Vishny (1992), the central
claim is that debt capacity within an industry is endogenously determined by
business conditions, because economic conjoncture drives the redeployability
of collateral. In a concluding heuristic remark, the authors note that debt
capacity, in turn, impacts positively the liquidity of the secondary market by
increasing its size. They conjecture that this feedback, causing liquidity to
be self-fulÞlling (it is worth investing if many other people are willing to),
may give rise to multiple equilibria. In Pagano (1989), stocks prices are all
the more sensitive to buy and sell orders because few investors participate
in the market. This sensitivity deters risk averse investors from paying an
exogenous cost to enter the stock market. Hence, low participation and high
volatility reinforce each other, giving rise to two equilibria, a "liquid" and an
"illiquid" one. In a model a la Kyle (1985), featuring informed speculators
and uninformed hedgers, Dow (2003) endogenizes the behavior of hedgers.
They are all the less willing to hedge because prices are volatile. As a result,
a low amount of noise trading and a high volatility reinforce each other, so
that both "illiquid" and "liquid" equilibria may be supported.
These contributions have two features in common:
1. They build upon an important market imperfection (Þnancial con-
straints in Shleifer and Vishny 1992, transaction costs in Pagano 1989,
private information in Dow 2003) which is ampliÞed by the liquidity
externality but would signiÞcantly plague the market anyway, even ab-
sent this coordination problem.
3
2. They obtain (or conjecture in the case of Shleifer and Vishny) sunspots
equilibria.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it captures this self-
fulÞlling dimension of liquidity in a setup which would be Þrst best at Þrst
order (in a sense precised later) absent this coordination problem. This sug-
gests that coordination failure may, at least theoretically, be the primary
driver of illiquidity and not only act as an ampliÞcation device. Second, a
unique equilibrium is obtained, which allows to measure the cost of coordina-
tion failure and predict some stylized facts regarding the design and diﬀusion
of Þnancial innovations.
1.2 Organization Of The Paper
Section 2 captures the intuition with multiple equilibria in an elementary 2×2
complete information game between 2 potential investors. Section 3 presents
a reduction to an unique equilibrium using the insightful technique of global
games introduced in Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Section 4 closes the
model by explicitly introducing the seller and derives a liquidity premium.
Section 5 extends this result to an arbitrary number of investors. Sections 6,
7 and 8 are applications. Section 6 dwells on the relationship between risk
and liquidity. Section 7 derives the optimality of debt like securities. Section
8 predicts the exponential diﬀusion of Þnancial innovations, eventhough there
is no such trend in the underlying risk. Section 9 concludes.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 An Elementary Issuance Game
2.1 Outline Of The Model
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. There are two identical investors indexed
by i and −i. At t = 0, each of them is being made the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
to pay π for a 50% share in the cash ßows generated by a given asset. The
asset pays oﬀ either 2 × RH with probability p or 2 × RL with probability
1− p at date 2, where
RH > RL ≥ 0 and p ∈ (0, 1)
Let
∆R = RH −RL
Investors are risk neutral and do not discount future cash ßows.
Each investor may be of two types, either patient or impatient. Her con-
sumption takes places at date 2 if she is patient, at date 1 if she is impatient.
Investors learn privately their type at date 1 only. At date 0, each of them
puts a prior probability q ∈ (0, 1) on being impatient. These liquidity shocks
a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) are not an important concern per se be-
cause investors may of course trade the asset in the secondary market at date
1. In this case, it is assumed that the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
to the buyer: Sellers have all the bargaining power in this model.
Investors types and the asset payoﬀ are assumed to be independent ran-
dom variables1.
1This is for simplicity. All that is really required is liquidity shocks not being perfectly
correlated.
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The only grain of sand in the wheels of this otherwise frictionless economy
is the following. It is assumed that an investor knows more about the asset
at date 1 if she has acquired a stake at date 0 than if she has not. There
are two justiÞcations for this "learning by owning". First, it is the case for
most securities (stocks, notes, assets backed securities,...) that the issuer
is legally constrained to provide investors with more information than the
public information available to outsiders. Second, it may just reßect some
learning by doing, investors having been in the market between 0 and 1 having
observed the behavior of the asset (e.g. its sensitivity to various factors) in
more detail than the others.
To keep things simple, it is actually assumed that an investor learns
perfectly the future payoﬀ at date 1 if she has invested while she receives no
additional information otherwise.
From now on, an investor is referred to as an insider if she has bought
the asset at date 0, as an outsider if she has not.
The timing of the game is summarized as follows:
 At t = 0, investors decide simultaneously whether to accept or decline
the oﬀer.
 At t = 1, investors learn privately their type and observe date 0 deci-
sions. Insiders also learn whether the asset pays oﬀ 2×RH or 2×RL.
An insider may make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to sell the asset to the
other investor. Then consumption of impatient investors takes place.
 At t = 2, asset pays oﬀ and consumption of patient investors takes
place.
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2.2 The Equilibria
At t = 1, an impatient insider faces a lemons problem if her counterpart is
an outsider. Thus, the purchase of the asset by investor −i creates a positive
externality on investor i. Indeed, it ensures that the liquidation value of the
asset at date 1, if i is impatient, will not be discounted by −i for adverse
selection. Hence the coordination problem and the multiplicity of equilibria.
Formally,
Proposition 1
If
¡
1− q2¢ (RL + p∆R)− π < 0
there is one unique equilibrium where no investor invests,
If
¡
1− q2¢ (RL + p∆R)− p2q (1− q)2∆R− π > 0
there is one unique equilibrium where both investors invest,
Otherwise, there are two pure strategies equilibria, one where no investor
invests, one where both investors invest.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As precised above, the multiplicity of equilibria stems basically from posi-
tive externalities for one investor if the other one invests, because it eliminates
the adverse selection discount in case of "Þre sale".
More precisely, the situation at date 1 may be analyzed as follows. As-
sume i invests at date 0 while −i does not. If i is patient but learns that the
asset performs poorly at date 1, she may sell it to −i, provided −i is patient,
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at a pooling price and pockets pq∆R. Thus, outsiders ignorance provides
her with a hedge on the asset. The expected according ex ante gain is
(1− q)2 × (1− p)× pq∆R
The ßip side of this hedge is that, conversely, if i is impatient, she faces the
lemons problem caused by this behavior. The ex ante according expected
loss is
−q (1− q)× p (1− q)∆R
Proposition 1 simply states that this latter negative eﬀect overcomes the
former positive one, leading to a global expected cost equal to
−p2q (1− q)2∆R
Classically, multiplicity of equilibria captures "self-fulÞlling liquidity" for
a given set of parameters. In this relevant range of parameters, the issuance
takes oﬀ only if investors are convinced that it is going to take oﬀ.
As noted in the Introduction, an important body of literature views the
liquidity premium as an adverse selection discount. Here, potential illiquidity
is only driven by fear of future adverse selection, but there is no lemons
problem, neither ex ante, nor ex post (at the equilibria). Adverse selection
is only a threat triggering coordination failure.
For the rest of the paper, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 1 (Small liquidity shocks)
The consequences of liquidity shocks which are not Þrst order with re-
spect to q are negligible.
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It must be emphasized that except for Proposition 4, none of the results
derived in the rest of the paper depends in any way upon this assumption.
It is made only to ease their interpretation. Indeed, under this assumption,
it is straightforward that Proposition 1 becomes
Proposition 1bis
Under Assumption 1 (small liquidity shocks), if
RL + p∆R− π < 0
there is one unique equilibrium where no investor invests,
If
RL + p∆R− p2q∆R− π > 0
there is one unique equilibrium where both investors invest,
Otherwise, there are two pure strategies equilibria, one where no in-
vestor invests, one where both investors invest.
It means in particular that if some form of coordination were imple-
mentable, liquidity shocks would not be a source of illiquidity per se, in
the sense that claims against the asset would be ßoated at a price equat-
ing the expected payoﬀ RL + p∆R. This is because investors would neglect
the risk that everybody experiences a liquidity shock. However, these neg-
ligible liquidity shocks are suﬃcient to trigger a coordination failure which
makes them in turn become a Þrst order problem. As a result, under this
assumption, it is possible to isolate the pure eﬀect of coordination failure in
an otherwise "Þrst best at Þrst order" world, where liquidity shocks do not
impact prices at all.
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A crucial property of this elementary model is the existence of values of
the parameters for which either purchasing the asset or not are dominant
strategies. This enables to build a global game characterized by an unique
symmetric equilibrium upon this simple coordination game. This is the pur-
pose of the next Section.
3 An Associated Global Game
The terminology of "global game" has been introduced by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993). They deÞne it as "an incomplete information game where the
actual payoﬀ structure is determined by a random draw from a given class
of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected
game". Carlsson and van Damme obtain the spectacular result that throwing
an amount of doubt, even arbitrarily small, in a complete information game
may yield a shift from multiple sunspots equilibria to an unique equilibrium.
Going beyond sunspots equilibria in coordination games is of course highly
relevant in Þnancial economics: Multiple equilibria are very much a theoreti-
cal dead-end preventing to push the analysis further. For instance, Goldstein
and Pauzner (2000) point out that because of sunspots equilibria, it is not
possible to tell whether banks are desirable or not in the model of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
The Þnancial application dealt with here is very diﬀerent, but from a pure
game theoretic standpoint, the situation is close to the treatment of currency
attacks or bank runs by Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2002, 2003). The only
additional source of complexity is that the payoﬀ functions are not linear in
the sense of Morris and Shin (2002).
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The complete information game of the former Section is modiÞed as fol-
lows.
1. The probability p is normally distributed, with mean p and precision
α. Let
eα = p− p
This distribution is common knowledge but p is not observed.
2. Before making her decision, investor j ∈ {i,−i} observes privately only
a noisy version of the actual probability p,
sj = p+ eβj
where eβj is a centered Gaussian with precision β. ³eα, eβi, eβ−i´ are mu-
tually independent and independent from the other sources of uncer-
tainty2.
3. At date 1, not only do insiders keep learning the actual assets payoﬀ,
but all investors, either insiders or outsiders, also learn the actual value
of p3.
Finally, the set of parameters is restricted as follows:
2A rigorous speciÞcation would of course require the distribution of eα being truncated so
that p belongs to (0, 1) almost surely. However, the only case considered in what follows is
the asymptotic one where α and β are arbitrarily large. In this case, truncated distributions
can be taken arbitrarily close to the non truncated ones and working directly with non
truncated distributions is an innocuous shortcut only meant to simplify the exposition.
3This assumption is not crucial but simpliÞes the exposition.
11
Assumption 2
π ∈ [RL, RH ]. Moreover, q < min
¡
RH−π
∆R
, 1
2
¢
.
The Þrst part of the Assumption just rules out absurd prices. Note that
the second one is consistent with Assumption 1 (small q).
The reader may point out that the introduction of private information
is a substantial deviation from the aim outlined in the Introduction, namely
capturing illiquidity in a frictionless setup. In some anticipation, the rest of
the paper actually focuses on the asymptotical situation where α and β are
taken arbitrarily large. In this limit case, the situation is arbitrarily close to
one of complete information.
Following Morris and Shin (1998), such private signals are interpreted
as "grains of doubts", which are not a source of undepricing per se but
suﬃce to obtain an unique equilibrium. The situation I have in mind is one
where investors have the same public information, which may be extremely
accurate, but diﬀer arbitrarily slightly in their interpretations. For instance,
in the case of a securitization deal, investors are very likely to assess the
prepayment risk in slightly diﬀerent ways eventhough very detailed public
information about the collateral is available. In the case of a new derivative
issuance, the estimation of its sensitivity should vary at least slightly across
investors even if the product and its underlying asset are perfectly well deÞned
and common knowledge.
Proposition 2 characterizes simply the unique symmetric equilibrium of
this game.
Proposition 2
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For α, β and β
α2
suﬃciently large, there is one unique symmetric equilib-
rium. Equilibrium strategies are characterized by a threshold value se such
that investor j ∈ {i,−i} invests only if
sj ≥ se
Moreover,
lim
α→∞
β→∞
β
α2
→∞
se =
π −RL
∆R
+
q
2
µ
π −RL
∆R
¶2
Proof. See the Appendix.
The spectacular part of this result is that uniqueness holds even for arbi-
trarily accurate public and private information. All that matters is that this
game is not one of pure complete information.
The keystone is that there are strictly dominant strategies for extreme
values of the signal, either small or large. This is suﬃcient to ignite a "chain
reaction" eliminating all the strategies by iterated strict dominance. Intu-
itively, if an investor receives a signal smaller than se, she puts a suﬃciently
high probability on the "higher order beliefs"4 of her fellow investor lying in
the area where not investing is dominant, so that it is not worth investing.
The process is of course symmetric for signals larger than se. As noted by
Morris and Shin (1998), the reason why a small "grain of doubt" is suﬃcient
to obtain this reduction to an unique equilibrium is that it is suﬃcient to have
the higher orders beliefs spanning all the possible values of p. The relevant
parameter is not the overall degree of uncertainty but the relative degrees of
4investors belief about other investors belief, investors belief about other investors
belief about investors belief...
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